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Abstract 
When young law graduates enter the legal profession they will 
undoubtedly be exposed to difficult situations that will demand of 
them to make difficult decisions, often having to balance 
conflicting systems of belief and ideas on what ethical behaviour 
entails. Legal ethics training in law faculties the world over often 
neglects teaching aspects of morality to focus on reviews of rules 
of professional legal conduct. This article argues that if legal 
education is to adequately prepare law graduates for legal 
practice, it must offer more than reviews of these codes of 
conduct. To properly assist law students in avoiding pitfalls which 
may lead to disciplinary action, they must be taught to 
appropriately use their moral compasses. 
This narrative aims to show that the metaphorical moral 
compass, with the cardinal virtues as possible main points, may 
serve as the crucial and underlying guide in the avoidance of the 
pitfalls which may result in a person being struck from the roll, 
but more than that, that it may aid in the pursuit of personal 
dreams or goals. The article contributes to the literature on legal 
ethics by foregrounding the virtues that pertain to sound conduct 
in a lawyer, as opposed to the rules and codes, in the hope that 
this may help legal practitioners to decide on what is right and 
what is wrong. 
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... law office conversations are almost always moral conversations. This is so 
because they involve law; law is a claim which people make on one another - 
a claim resting on obligation, a moral claim - and one upon which they may 
seek the sanction and coercion of the state. In this derivative sense, a 
conversation about rights and duties is by definition a moral conversation.1 
1  Introduction 
In recent years, public perception of the legal profession in South Africa has 
been tainted by media reports about professional misconduct.2 Where 
instances of misconduct are verified in court, the legal practitioners involved 
can be (and often are) removed from the roll of attorneys or advocates. Such 
removal is evidence of the fact that the court no longer considers these 
practitioners "fit and proper", or of sufficient moral fibre to serve in the legal 
system. 
Being fit and proper is of the utmost importance to legal practitioners. Not 
only is it a fundamental statutory requirement for admittance, but it is also 
indispensable in avoiding disbarment from the esteemed and honourable 
profession of the law.3 Since no legislative or regulatory framework exists to 
describe exactly what it is to be fit and proper, and since it is clearly the 
cornerstone upon which entry to legal practice rests, law students 
approaching the dawn of their careers may rightly ponder the questions: 
"What is meant by 'fit and proper'?" or "How do I avoid being struck from the 
roll?" A good place to look for the answers to these questions is the 
professional codes of conduct, for example. Apart from this external source, 
a student may also answer these questions internally; that is, with reference 
to his own moral compass.  
While conceding that rules of professional conduct are important to legal 
practice, Schiltz4 warns that this importance should not be overestimated. 
While legal practitioners make daily decisions about what ethical conduct is 
and whether or not they will conduct themselves in an ethical manner, 
formal rules of conduct have very little to do with this decision-making 
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1  Shaffer 1979 Notre Dame Law 232. 
2  See Waldner City Press 2; Venter Star 4; Peters Daily News 6; Maphumulo Sunday 
Independent 1. For a thorough discussion of selected cases, see Slabbert 2011 PELJ 
211-221. 
3  See ss 3 and 7(1)(d) of the Admission of Advocates Act 74 of 1964 (as amended) and 
ss 15 and 22(1)(d) of the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. 
4  Schiltz 1998 Minn L Rev 713. 
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process. Rules of professional conduct do not define ethical legal practice, 
which requires much more than mere rule compliance.5  
Slabbert6 writes that in South Africa it is commonly accepted that to be fit 
and proper, a legal practitioner must exhibit integrity, reliability and honesty. 
Yet Slabbert7 also believes that formal legal education does not adequately 
prepare students for the moral challenges of the legal profession. Teaching 
legal ethics properly at university may very well be one way of helping to 
ensure that a law student, as a prospective lawyer, understands and 
adheres to the requirements of being a fit and proper person. Unless they 
decide to become lecturers, law students will be exposed to further training 
in legal ethical practice when doing their clerkship or pupillage. The vital role 
mentors play at this stage cannot be negated. Nevertheless, legal education 
plays an essential role in teaching legal ethics and how students perceive 
themselves in society.8 The law lecturer is an important link in attempting to 
ensure morally upright legal practitioners. 
This article argues that if legal education in law faculties, as one of the 
important role-players in forming sound lawyers, is to succeed in producing 
legal graduates of strong moral fibre and who are fit for practice, it must offer 
more than reviews of codes of conduct. To properly assist law students in 
avoiding pitfalls which may lead to disciplinary action, they must be informed 
about how their internal moral compasses can help them do so.9  
Bearing these issues in mind, what follows is in many ways a narrative of a 
particular (perhaps peculiar) law student's10 quest to discover how the moral 
compass relates to legal ethics and what the basics of such a compass 
ought to be, especially within the context of legal practice. This narrative 
aims to show that the metaphorical moral compass, with the cardinal virtues 
as possible main points, may serve as the crucial guide in the avoidance of 
the pitfalls which may result in a person being struck from the roll, but more 
than that, it may aid in the pursuit of personal dreams or goals.11 The article 
contributes to the literature on legal ethics by considering the virtues as 
                                            
5  Schiltz 1998 Minn L Rev 713. 
6  Slabbert 2011 PELJ 212. 
7  Slabbert 2011 PELJ 223. 
8  See Whitear-Nel and Freedman 2015 Fundamina 236-237, 249. They conclude (at 
250) that throughout the post-Apartheid development of the LLB degree, the 
"importance of teaching legal ethics ... has been acknowledged". 
9  In the context of this article, "moral compass" refers to one's ability to judge right from 
wrong and to act accordingly. 
10  This is a reference to the first author. 
11  An idea that is supported by Schiltz 1998 Minn L Rev 787. 
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supplementary to the rules and codes, which may help legal practitioners in 
deciding on what is right and what is wrong.  
To demonstrate these goals, some of the possible pitfalls will be considered. 
Then legal ethics and its relation with the moral compass will be described, 
and this will be followed by a discussion on the meaning of the moral 
compass and the value of including it in a legal education curriculum.  
2 Possible pitfalls that may threaten the "fit and proper" 
status  
Although an applicant bears the burden of proof to show that he is "fit and 
proper" to be admitted as an attorney or advocate, the final decision lies 
with the court and is essentially discretionary. A senior in the profession 
interviews the applicant and then testifies whether the applicant is a "fit and 
proper" person or not. The court finally confirms the senior's discretionary 
value-judgement, but judges may also ask additional questions to their 
satisfaction.12  
But what are some of the reasons why persons are struck from the roll for 
no longer being "fit and proper" persons? Perhaps more importantly, how 
does one avoid them? Before we consider the how, note must be taken of 
the what. Slabbert13 offers the following as possible reasons why lawyers 
do not act as fit and proper persons: 
a) The adversarial system in which there are two opposing parties. This 
system has the potential to sometimes pressure a lawyer to place his 
client's interest not only ahead of the interest of the adversary but 
ultimately ahead of the interests of justice.14  
b) Increased competition at a professional level and among law firms who 
sacrifice morality "... in order to take and win more cases" than the 
opposition.  
c) Legal education at universities that does not prepare prospective 
lawyers for the moral challenges of the legal profession. 
                                            
12  Slabbert 2011 PELJ 218. 
13  Slabbert 2011 PELJ 221-223. 
14  See Slabbert 2011 PELJ 221 citing (at fn 53) Eshete "Does a Lawyer's Character 
Matter?" 272. 
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d) The general lawlessness which is prevalent and perceptible in society. 
Moral bonds are relaxed and persons either lack or do not use their 
internal moral compasses.  
General lawlessness and the relaxation of moral bonds emphasise why 
focus on the moral compass is important and necessary for law students 
and lawyers.15 In everyday legal practice, attorneys and advocates are 
expected to make difficult decisions in often difficult circumstances. This 
process frequently requires legal practitioners to balance conflicting 
systems of belief.16 In a country as diverse in culture, beliefs and customs 
as South Africa, decisions on what is moral and immoral can potentially be 
complicated and uncertain. While considerations of what is "right" and 
"wrong" might share some common ground, the question of what is moral 
or immoral conduct in all challenging legal circumstances can become 
difficult. The legal profession, in order to address the potential for 
uncertainty in legal ethical disputes, strives to maintain confidence and 
nobility, and aspires to protect the public from unethical and unprofessional 
lawyers. To assist lawyers in avoiding ethical pitfalls and ambiguity in 
deciding on what is right and wrong, the legal profession has developed a 
system of professional codes and rules of conduct by which its members 
must abide.17 But while these codes and rules of conduct establish wide 
parameters of acceptable and unacceptable conduct, they do not inform on 
fit and proper character and moral formation.18 
Rothenberg19 argues that very difficult ethical issues in legal practice arise 
due to the tensions inherent in legal practitioners' competing responsibilities 
towards their clients, the legal system and the quality of justice. Tertiary 
legal training, it is argued here, should empower students with foundational 
standards and skills beyond codes of conduct to assist them in exploring 
these issues in terms of what is right and wrong, instead of what is 
acceptable to win a case. 
                                            
15  Benson 2000 UBC L Rev 519 notes: "A deeper ground for moral education is both 
necessary to citizenship and largely missing from contemporary education of all sorts 
including the law. What now stands in the place of moral education is a series of 
disconnected concepts (e.g. 'tolerance,' 'equality,' 'self-esteem,' and 'rights') that are 
themselves obscured by a loss of historic understanding of such concepts as 'virtue' 
and the rise of a superficial language of 'values'". (Our emphasis).  
16  Rothenberg 2009 U Tol L Rev 412. 
17  For example: the Rules for Professional Conduct of the General Council of the Bar for 
advocates; the rules for conduct for attorneys by the South African Law Society; the 
Code of Conduct for members of the National Prosecuting Authority, etc.  
18  Rothenberg 2009 U Tol L Rev 412. 
19  Rothenberg 2009 U Tol L Rev 412-413. 
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3 Legal ethics and the moral compass 
Legal ethics plays an important part in ensuring that the conduct of lawyers 
meets the requirement of a fit and proper person and protects the public 
from unprofessional and unethical lawyers. Legal ethics should also play a 
significant role in guiding the lawyer to avoid the pitfalls or possible reasons 
(as listed above) for not being a fit and proper person. If legal ethics plays a 
role in helping a person to be fit and proper, what role does a moral compass 
have? In order to explore the relation between legal ethics and the moral 
compass, we need to explore what each is.  
3.1 Legal ethics briefly explored 
Legal ethics falls within the broader realm of ethics, which is the "the 
philosophical study of morality..."20 or "[a] set of moral principles, esp. those 
of a specified religion, school of thought, etc."21 Legal ethics may be defined 
as: 
The minimum standards of appropriate conduct within the legal profession, 
involving the duties that its members owe one another, their clients and the 
courts ... [t]he written regulations governing those duties.22 
or 
The code of conduct among lawyers which governs their moral and 
professional duties toward one another, toward their clients, and toward the 
courts.23 
The term legal ethics has a narrow and a broad meaning. Narrowly, it refers 
to "... the system of professional regulations governing the conduct of 
lawyers".24 However, legal ethics is more than the mere rules or regulations 
of the legal profession, since it also connotes "the moral principles" of the 
legal profession. Broadly speaking, therefore, legal ethics is a specific and 
singular case of ethics in general.25  
Why then does a lawyer need to use his moral compass if legal ethics, which 
includes the moral principles of the legal profession, can serve as a guide 
to avoid the pitfalls of being struck from the roll? According to Kiefel,26 a 
                                            
20  Audi Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 284. 
21  Stevenson Shorter Oxford English Dictionary Vol 1 869 (original emphasis omitted). 
22  Garner Black's Law Dictionary 913. 
23  Handler Ballentine's Law Dictionary 300. 
24  Garner Black's Law Dictionary 913 quoting Rhode and Luban Legal Ethics. 
25  Garner Black's Law Dictionary 913 quoting Rhode and Luban Legal Ethics. 
26  Kiefel "Ethics and the Profession of the Lawyer" 1.  
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Justice of the High Court of Australia, the "Rules of Professional Conduct 
and Practice" do provide lawyers with guidance and standards of conduct; 
however, 
[t]hey cannot provide the answer to every ethical and moral question which a 
lawyer may face; for that a lawyer needs his or her own moral compass.  
Bahnsen27 writes that "all of life is ethical ...". Hence, a lawyer will always 
use his moral compass. Where legal ethics, especially in the form of a 
narrow set of rules, is silent or perhaps inconclusive on the issues facing 
the lawyer, the practitioner uses his moral compass to decide what is right 
and just. In other words, to remain fit and proper when answering those 
"ethical and moral questions" a lawyer needs to use his moral compass.  
A moral compass is also more readily accessible where immediate 
decisions are needed to resolve the ethical choices one faces each day. 
This does not mean that a lawyer "grabs" his moral compass only when 
other sources are silent or ambiguous. A moral compass is internal; it is 
something its possessor "carries" with him everywhere. Consequently, 
whenever a decision or judgement is made, the internal moral compass is 
used. Whether the decision made follows the direction indicated by the 
moral compass or not is another question. Whenever a decision or 
judgement is made and action is taken accordingly, one must be able to 
defend one's decision and subsequent action.  
A moral compass, in relation to legal ethics, is also necessary in that it 
signifies certain qualities or traits of character which will not only keep a 
lawyer or a law student fit and proper for the mere sake of being fit and 
proper, but also for the sake of helping him to pursue his dreams or goals – 
whether of being a selfless servant of the public, an advocate, a revered 
Constitutional Court judge, a Member of Parliament, an academic or a 
lecturer.  
3.1.1 Moral compass briefly explored 
One's moral compass has been briefly shown to have a viable and 
necessary interaction with legal ethics and the legal profession. But what is 
it? The metaphorical moral compass may be defined as "a natural feeling 
that makes people know what is right and wrong and how they should 
behave..."28 or as a term "[u]sed in reference to a person's ability to judge 
                                            
27  Bahnsen By This Standard 21. 
28  Cambridge Dictionaries Online date unknown http://bit.ly/1Nwd7Vw. 
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what is right and wrong and act accordingly..."29 The definition of a 
"conscience", which is a synonym of the moral compass," is also instructive 
in describing this metaphor. "Conscience" is "[a] moral sense of right and 
wrong..."30 or "the sense of right and wrong that governs a person's thoughts 
and actions."31 "Conscience" and the metaphorical moral compass are 
closely related in that both involve a sense or feeling of what is right and 
wrong. This "moral sense" is "the ability to distinguish between right and 
wrong, especially as a faculty of the human mind."32 The metaphorical moral 
compass may therefore be described here to mean the ability, as developed 
and formed, of a lawyer or a law student to judge or decide what is right and 
wrong and then to act according to his judgement or decision, knowing that 
he should be able to defend his judgement or decision.  
Virtues aid in deciding between right and wrong. Hence they are important 
components of the moral compass. An honest lawyer will not lie to the court; 
one with integrity will not overcharge clients; a punctual student will not be 
late for lectures, etc. It is imperative that one should develop virtues, as they 
will contribute to rendering one a fit and proper person. These virtues will 
also help one to accomplish ones dreams and goals.33 
Virtues important to the "fit and proper" requirement for admission to legal 
practice include the following: integrity and being honest, being responsible 
and being courteous. To start this quest for virtues, which comprise an 
important part of one's moral compass, we turn to the classical labelling of 
the principal or fundamental virtues: the cardinal virtues.  
4 The cardinal virtues – the main four points of your 
compass  
Once again using the metaphor of a moral compass, it is suggested here 
that the cardinal virtues may serve as the four main points (North, East, 
South and West) of one's moral compass. The cardinal virtues provide a 
starting point, a skeleton which may be fleshed out with virtues which one 
considers to be of more personal or professional relevance and importance 
than others. Individuals are unique, and in South Africa's vibrant society 
people come from diverse backgrounds, cultures and religions. Hence, each 
unique person's moral compass will have "features" or "characteristics" 
                                            
29  Oxford Dictionaries date unknown http://bit.ly/1reSvY1. 
30  Stevenson Shorter Oxford English Dictionary - Vol 1 494. 
31  Summers and Holmes Collins English Dictionary 244. 
32  Stevenson Shorter Oxford English Dictionary - Vol 1 1835. 
33  See in this regard Schiltz 1998 Minn L Rev 787. 
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particular to that person. Regardless of the unique features, there ought to 
be some indispensable basics in the moral compass of a person. In this 
narrative the cardinal virtues are suggested as such basic building blocks.  
4.1 What is a virtue? 
A virtue may be defined as "the quality or practice of moral excellence or 
righteousness".34 According to Blackburn35 
[a] virtue is a trait of character that is to be admired: one rendering its 
possessor better, either morally, or intellectually, or in the conduct of specific 
affairs. 
Benson36 notes that "... 'virtues' are objective moral norms that are both 
shared and personal". 
For the purposes of this article, a virtue may be described as an objective 
moral norm or an internal quality or trait of character which influences or 
directs the ability to judge between right and wrong and to act accordingly.  
The four virtues (wisdom, fortitude, temperance and justice) were grouped 
together as the cardinal virtues by St. Thomas Aquinas.37 However, their 
importance can be traced to the writers of the classical period: Socrates, 
Plato and Aristotle.38 These four virtues were termed "cardinal", a term 
which comes from the Latin word meaning "the hinge of the door."39 All other 
virtues are therefore said to pivot or "hinge" on the four principal or 
fundamental virtues. Apart from these four moral or "natural virtues" there 
are also three "inspired" or theological virtues: faith, hope and charity.40 
Virtues are shared because we can all know what they are; that is, they are 
objective.41 Virtues are also personal, since one can assess oneself 
personally in relation to a particular virtue.42 For example, when assessing 
oneself in relation to temperance one may determine that one's over-
indulgence is a lack of temperance. Related to this is the concept that each 
of the cardinal virtues, and any other virtue, is a via media or middle between 
                                            
34  Summers and Holmes Collins English Dictionary 1350; also see Stevenson Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary – Vol 2 3538. 
35  Blackburn Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 381 (my emphasis). 
36  Benson 2008 JJS 16 (author's original emphasis omitted). 
37  Benson 2008 JJS 17.  
38  Benson 2008 JJS 17; also see Van Zyl 2010 Fundamina 528-529. 
39  See Benson 2008 JJS 17; and Lewis Mere Christianity 76. 
40  Benson 2008 JJS 11; 17-18; and Lewis Mere Christianity 76.  
41  Benson 2008 JJS 16. 
42  Benson 2008 JJS 16. 
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two extremes.43 For example, temperance is the mean or middle way 
between unfounded abstinence44 and over-indulgence. Consequently, in 
developing or pursuing the perfection of a virtue, one assesses oneself to 
determine where one is in relation to that middle way, and then one grows 
toward that middle way.  
Before a brief introductory discussion of each of the cardinal virtues, a 
caution by Lewis about the difference between a virtuous act and a virtuous 
person must be noted.45 He points out that the distinction is important 
because one might get the wrong idea that it does not matter how or why 
one performed a virtuous act, only that one has done it. These virtuous acts 
... done for the wrong reason do not help to build the internal quality or 
character called a "'virtue,"' and it is this quality or character that really 
matters.46  
4.2 Wisdom (prudence) 
Wisdom (rendered in Latin as sapientia by Cicero) is not merely the 
accumulation of theoretical knowledge, but also includes "practical wisdom" 
or prudence.47 It was Aristotle who introduced this distinction between 
theoretical wisdom (sophia) and practical wisdom (phronesis).48 In fact, 
Lewis49 does not even mention "wisdom." He refers only to "prudence", 
which he says is "practical common sense".  
For a lawyer using this point of his moral compass, wisdom entails two 
things. Firstly, wisdom means a sound "theoretical knowledge" of the law 
and its workings and an understanding of legal ethics. Secondly, wisdom 
(or prudence) requires a lawyer to apply "practical common sense" in his 
dealings with the law, the courts, colleagues, clients and society. He must 
heed the proverb that "the prudent man looketh well to his going".50 The 
prudent man does not speed down the road of life (or any other road); he 
observes his way with "practical common sense". Prudence therefore 
navigates the mean between impulsiveness and over-cautiousness and 
                                            
43  Benson 2008 JJS 18. 
44  Unfounded abstinence because abstinence can in itself also be a virtue. 
45  Lewis Mere Christianity 79-80.  
46  Lewis Mere Christianity 80. 
47  Van Zyl 2010 Fundamina 529. 
48  Audi Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 976. 
49  Lewis Mere Christianity 77. 
50  See the Book of Proverbs 14:15. 
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performs the special function of assisting in the choice "between good and 
evil".51 
4.3 Courage (fortitude) 
According to Lewis,52 fortitude includes two kinds of courage. The first is 
probably the one that immediately comes to mind when one hears the word 
courage: bravery, lack of fear, or the courage that faces danger.53 The 
second type of courage is the type "that 'sticks it' under pain".54 "Guts" or 
"perseverance" are good modern renderings. Cicero points out that the 
virtue of "fortitude (fortitudo) comes to the fore in dealing with toil and 
trouble..."55  
A courageous lawyer or law student is therefore one who perseveres or 
sticks at it when he has to prepare for a case or study for a test and when 
he has to toil at a difficult legal problem. A courageous lawyer is one who is 
not afraid to do all that he can to ensure that justice prevails and is 
accessible. He boldly pursues his goals and dreams. A courageous lawyer 
is one who, in the face of losing much profit, follows the advice of former 
president of the United States of America and lawyer Abraham Lincoln:  
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors [sic] to compromise whenever 
you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser — in 
fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a peacemaker the lawyer has a superior 
opportunity of being a good man. There will still be business enough.56 
Courage is also connected with the other virtues, in that growing towards 
the middle way or developing a virtue takes courage (guts or perseverance). 
It takes courage to pursue justice, to practise moderation or to acquire 
knowledge. 
4.4 Temperance (self-restraint or moderation) 
Lewis57 emphasises that temperance does not mean teetotalism and 
neither does it refer just to alcohol but to all pleasures. Temperance also 
does not mean unfounded abstinence, "... but going the right length and no 
further".58 In other words being moderate and not extreme. Temperance 
                                            
51  Van Zyl 2010 Fundamina 531. 
52  Lewis Mere Christianity 79. 
53  Lewis Mere Christianity 79. 
54  Lewis Mere Christianity 79. 
55  Van Zyl 2010 Fundamina 531. 
56  Basler Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 81. 
57  Lewis Mere Christianity 78. 
58  Lewis Mere Christianity 78. 
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does not mean that pleasure or the delights of life are alien to the one who 
pursues the perfection of or develops this virtue, but rather that he exploits 
pleasure to his benefit and not to his harm.  
By way of example, temperance for a law student would mean that he 
moderates himself in the partaking of red wine in such a manner that his 
driving of a motor vehicle will remain within the bounds of the law or that he 
will be in possession of all his mental faculties for tomorrow's test. In 
exercising temperance, a lawyer or law student does so courageously in the 
face of tempting over-indulgence in pleasure, in prudent consideration of 
the possible adverse consequences of such over-indulgent pleasure, and 
ultimately in pursuit of justice.  
4.5 Justice 
Finally we come to the virtue which a lawyer may rightly see as the most 
important virtue in his profession: justice.  
Cicero referred to justice as "the intention to give to each what he deserves", 
and this was echoed by St. Thomas Aquinas.59 Justice, apart from what we 
associate with courts of law, can also be described as "fairness".60 Ever 
since Aristotle's time, "... justice has commonly been identified both with 
obeying the law and with treating everyone with fairness".61 Justice, as a 
pivotal virtue, includes virtues such as honesty, truthfulness and keeping 
promises.62  
Although some writers view wisdom as the primary cardinal virtue, justice 
was seen by Cicero "...as a virtue underlying all human relationships on the 
basis of shared interests and the need to give to each his own (suum cuique 
tribuere)".63 For a lawyer the virtue of justice may very well be the underlying 
virtue. A lawyer may strive to be just or fair in his relationship and interaction 
with his clients, the court, the public and colleagues. But more than being a 
man pursuing the perfection of or developing the virtue of justice, a lawyer 
also seeks justice or fair treatment for others, whether it be for the alleged 
victim or for the alleged perpetrator of some crime or delict. According to 
Van Zyl64 the virtue of justice  
                                            
59  Van Zyl 2002 Fundamina 239-240. 
60  Lewis Mere Christianity 79. 
61  Audi Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 456. 
62  Lewis Mere Christianity 79. 
63  Van Zyl 2010 Fundamina History 531. 
64  Van Zyl 2002 Fundamina 236-237 (my emphasis). 
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... occupies primacy of position [in the judicial sphere]. It is the essential 
function of a judge to do justice between man and man. In doing so, he must 
apply his knowledge and insight with wisdom and prudence. The need for 
impartiality and independence, however, requires that he acts with courage 
and fearlessness. But then again, he cannot exercise his functions like a bull 
in a China shop. He must do so with temperance and self-control. In this way 
he may be assured that justice will be done in a fair and reasonable way, as 
required by the community which he serves. 
Although justice may play a leading role, Cicero points out that each cardinal 
virtue still has its special function to perform, and justice's function is to 
accord to each his own.65 The above quotation shows how justice relates to 
the virtues of courage, wisdom and temperance to lead ultimately result to 
just decision.  
Finally, Cicero pronounced that by applying the cardinal virtues "...one could 
achieve the 'greatest good' (summum bonum) which would be reflected by 
the leading of a virtuous, moral and ethically correct life".66 These pivotal 
virtues provide a framework which will foster the development of other 
virtues relevant and important to the individual and his profession or 
occupation. Examples of such other virtues include being honest, 
responsible, merciful, deferent, committed, dependable, diligent, 
persuasive, thorough, punctual, tolerant and truthful.  
5 Conclusion 
When one observes that all these "fallen" lawyers were once regarded as 
fit and proper persons and in all likelihood were familiar with the content of 
legal ethics, it nurtures the realisation that a lawyer cannot rely on mere 
rules and codes alone to be a fit and proper person. This person has and 
must use his moral compass. This realisation should encourage students to 
take up their moral and social responsibility to use their internal moral 
compasses as an important means to be a fit and proper legal servant of 
the public. However, a moral compass must have moral content. Developing 
and pursuing the perfection of the cardinal virtues and of other virtues 
improves and directs one's moral compass, which in turn helps ensure that 
one remains a fit and proper person. However, for the law student who 
desires to be better than the minimum requirement, the pursuit of these and 
other virtues supports him in realising his dreams or goals of being a selfless 
public servant, a revered judge or an efficient prosecutor. 
                                            
65  Van Zyl 2010 Fundamina 531-532. 
66  Van Zyl 2010 Fundamina 529. 
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The moral compass should not be seen as an idealistic ambition, but as a 
useful tool for law students and lecturers alike in the face of an increasing 
lack of moral fibre in the legal profession and society at large. Benson67 
argues that "the language of virtues" should be (re-)built into courses at 
schools and universities along with the narratives "that illustrate [virtues] and 
their relationship to the happiness and proper freedom that is integral to 
human flourishing". Benson68 also points out that if we are to achieve "an 
educational renaissance" we must start with the teachers, because they are 
the ones who have been deprived of "the language of virtues", which is vital 
to reform education. While it is certainly not the province of lecturers to 
configure a moral compass from scratch in law students (that may well be 
the primary job of their parents, family, schools and religion) it has arguably 
become necessary for lecturers to impress upon students the vital place of 
a moral compass in the legal profession and its necessity for a just and 
accessible legal system. This is done in addition to conveying the import of 
codes of ethics in the relevant courses. 
Inevitably the law lecturer teaches students who each have their own 
worldviews based on either religious or non-religious beliefs, which 
worldviews inform their moral compasses.69 Each of these students from 
diverse backgrounds makes and will have to make moral choices. In the 
light of this diversity of beliefs, the lecturer might be "prudent" to require 
reflection essays or to facilitate discussions and debates on topics such as 
"your moral compass", "fit and proper", "what are legal virtues" and "cardinal 
virtues". Such discussions and debates would not only expose students to 
the diversity of beliefs in South African society but would also be an 
opportunity to foster respect for other persons, despite their being different 
from oneself. While students have the freedom to develop their moral 
compasses in line with their own beliefs, the cardinal virtues remain possible 
essential points on the moral compass. There are, of course, also virtues 
                                            
67  Benson 2008 JJS 20. This is opposite to the problematic "language of values" 
prevalent in moral language today, which confusion Benson identifies and argues 
against. Benson 2000 UBC L Rev 532-533 writes that "[i]t would be better that 
children, the citizens of tomorrow, be taught something of 'justice' and 'prudence' ..." 
than to be taught about subjective and "... necessarily ambiguous 'values'". Ultimately, 
"how can a student differentiate between what is genuinely good and necessary and 
what is personal and, perhaps, trivial ..." when "... the axiom of modernity, is that 'you 
have your values and I have mine.'"? (original emphasis). 
68  Benson 2008 JJS 21. 
69  Benson 2000 UBC L Rev 532 notes that a "...'virtues based' curriculum ought not to 
conflict with religious or non-religious liberal beliefs and ought to provide a much richer 
ground for citizenship and public education than the current 'soft relativism' of 'values-
based' education which amounts to little more than a mélange of half-formed 
sentiments". 
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which are more particular to the legal profession, eg honesty, integrity and 
justice, or to the law student, like studiousness and diligence. On these and 
other virtues the lecturer may focus as "legal virtues".  
Gilbert K Chesterton70 declared in 1901: "The act of defending any of the 
cardinal virtues has to-day all the exhilaration of a vice." Hopefully, lecturers 
will experience this thrill when they emphasise and facilitate discussions on 
the necessity of being guided by one's moral compass in life and in law.  
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